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INTRODUCTION
A man's useful inventions subject him to insult, robbery, and abuse.
- Benjamin Franklin
1
Patent litigation is a booming industry. In 2011, patent
infringement litigation placed more than twenty-nine billions worth of
corporate assets at risk.2 It is not uncommon for awards in patent
infringement lawsuits to reach up into the hundreds of millions of
dollars.3 When an infringer acts "willfully," those awards may be
enhanced up to three times the amount of compensatory damages
awarded.4 Due to the enormous sums of money at risk, the standard
used to determine the appropriateness of an award for enhanced
damages is vital to the future of innovation in the United States.5
Review of the current standard used to determine an award of
enhanced damages for willfulness (i.e., willfulness standard) in patent
infringement litigation is currently before the Supreme Court.6 Many
experts agree the current willfulness standard requires modification to
1. Address of the Advocate of the Patentees, Inventors of Useful
Improvements in the Arts and Sciences: In Defence of Mental Property 7 (Dec. 19,
1806).
2. Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by
Shifting Attorneys'Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 356 (2013).
3. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced
Damages After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REv. 417, 422
(2012).
4. Id. at 421-22.
5. See Randy R. Micheletti, Willful Patent Infringement After In Re Seagate:
Just What is "Objectively Reckless " Infringement?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 975, 975-
76 (2010).
6. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
84 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-1520); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S.
Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-1513).
[Vol. 52
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close a loophole that unfairly allows select defendants to escape
liability under 35 U.S.C. § 284.7 However, petitioners in Halo and
Stryker contend the current willfulness standard should be lowered in
accordance with the Court's recent modification to the standard used
to determine attorney's fees (i.e., attorney's fee standard) in patent
cases, arguing the two standards are linked.8 A brief look into the
jurisprudential histories of the respective statutes and contrasting legal
purposes served by each, however, debunks the notion that these
statutes are somehow linked - or should ever be linked - in any
legally meaningful way. As such, any modification to the willfulness
standard should not be predicated on the recently modified attorney's
fee standard.
This note begins with Part I providing a general overview of the
patent infringement litigation process. Part II discusses the current
debate surrounding the willfulness and attorney's fee standards in
patent infringement litigation. It provides brief statutory histories of
the two statutes, details the Supreme Court's rationale for nullifying
the previous attorney's fee standard, and lays out the general
arguments currently before the Supreme Court. Part III examines the
jurisprudential histories of the two standards in an effort to dispel the
notion that the two standards are predicated on similar case law or
legal reasoning. Part IV explores the distinctive legal functions
performed by each award, and the unequal treatment of the litigants
stemming from their respective legal purpose. Finally, Part V
discusses the need for modification of the current enhanced damages
standard and proposes a minor adjustment to cure this standard of two
defects inherent in its current framework.
7. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
9, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1520); Brief
of Nokia Technologies Oy and Nokia USA Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1520); and Brief of Intellectual Property Professors as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 21, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs.,
Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1513).
8. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782
F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1520); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Halo
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1513).
2016]
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I. OVERVIEW OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
Inventors are eligible to receive a patent when they invent a "new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,"
or improve upon any existing invention in some unique, non-obvious
manner.9 Patents exist "[to] promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and
useful [a]rts"'10 by giving an inventor, the patentee, exclusive rights"
of the use of their innovation in exchange for its public disclosure.' 2
If another party infringes on the patentee's exclusive rights, the
patentee is entitled to compensation for the losses stemming from the
infringement. 13  The infringer's state of mind is not relevant to a
baseline finding of infringement, making it a strict liability tort.' 4
However, if the infringer acts "willfully" in infringing another's
patent, the patentee becomes eligible to receive discretionary treble
damages,' 5 in addition to actual damages and attorney's fees.' 6 The
willfulness and attorney's fee standards in patent law both evolved to
require objective and subjective inquiries' 7 and are often discussed as
being linked. 18  To determine whether such a link exists, an
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
10. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 8.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (Patentees are granted exclusive rights to
prevent others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the patented
invention).
12. David J. Weitz, The Biological Deposit Requirement: A Means of Assuring
Adequate Disclosure, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 276 (1993).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
14. Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2011).
15. Seaman, supra note 3, at 421.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
17. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Brooks
Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749
(2014).
18. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (O'Malley, J., concurring); iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating "[t]he objective baselessness standard for enhanced
damages and attorneys' fees against a non-prevailing plaintiff under Brooks
Furniture is identical to the objective recklessness standard for enhanced damages
and attorneys' fees against an accused infringer for § 284 willful infringement
actions under In re Seagate .... "1).
194 [Vol. 52
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examination of the statutory histories and jurisprudential evolution of
the two standards becomes necessary.
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE: ARE THE STANDARDS LINKED?
A. Seagate: The Enhanced Damages Standard Under Section 284
Treble damages in patent litigation date back to 1793.19 Codified
into 35 U.S.C. 284 (Section 284) in 1952, the statute grants to courts
the discretion to increase damages by up to three times the amount
awarded for compensatory damages. 20 Though the statute fails to list
specific instances when enhanced damages are appropriate, Section
284 has evolved to require "willful" conduct on the part of the
infringer.21
"Willfulness" in the patent infringement context was originally
considered to be a matter of degree, such as "unknowing, or
accidental, to deliberate, or reckless[] disregard of a patentee's legal
rights."22  This changed, however, when the courts instituted an
"affirmative duty of care" standard to determine when an infringer has
acted "willfully." 23 During the "affirmative duty of care" era, conduct
akin to negligence was sufficient to prove willful infringement.24
Under this standard, a potential infringer had an "affirmative duty to
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing...
[w]here [he] has actual notice of another's patent rights. ' 25 This duty
required the potential infringer to obtain an opinion of counsel prior to
"the initiation of any possible infringing activity. ' 26 If a court found
19. B.D. Daniel, The Right of Trial by Jury in Patent Infringement Cases, 28
REv. LITIG. 735, 776 (2009).
20. 35 U.S.C § 284 (2012).
21. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923
F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
22. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
23. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-
90 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
24. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1368 (quoting Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
26. Id. at 1368-69.
2016]
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the infringer to have breached this affirmative duty, a court would
then use prescribed factors - known as the ReadF7 factors - to
calculate whether and by how much to enhance damages resulting
from his breach.28  As time passed, the standard for proving
"willfulness" became more stringent, until the Federal Circuit in In re
Seagate Technology, LLC raised the standard to prove "willfulness"
from an "affirmative duty of care" standard to an
"objective/subjective" standard.29
In 2007, the Federal Circuit used Seagate30 to rewrite the
willfulness standard in an effort to align patent jurisprudence with
related areas of tort law.31 The court reasoned the previous standard
allowed for findings of "willfulness" for acts not consistent with the
"egregious conduct typically associated with punitive damages."32 To
be awarded enhanced damages under Section 284, the Seagate
standard added an objective prong that requires the patentee to first
show that the infringer "acted despite an objectively high likelihood
that its actions constituted infringement .... ,3 If the patentee
satisfies the objective prong, the patentee must then satisfy the
subjective prong by proving that the "objectively-defined risk.., was
27. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Read lists nine factors to consider in deciding whether and by how
much to enhance damages: (1) "deliberate[] copy[ing"]; (2) failure to "investigate[]
the scope of the patent," knowing the patent existed; (3) "the infringer's behavior as
a party to the litigation"; (4) "[d]efendant's size and financial condition"; (5)
"[c]loseness of the case"; (6) "[d]uration of the defendant's misconduct"; (7)
"[r]emedial action by the defendant"; (8) "[d]efendant's motivation for harm"; and
(9) "[w]hether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.").
28. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
29. See id. at 1371 (Seagate abandoned the affirmative duty of care standard
devised in Underwater Devices and replaced it with the objective/subjective
standard discussed in below.).
30. James E. Hopenfeld, A Proposal for A "Good-Faith Offer" Standard for
Evaluating Allegations of Willful Infringement-with Thanks to Major League
Baseball, 20 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 5, 16 (2010).
31. SeeSeagate, 497 F.3dat 1371.
32. Dani Prati, Note, In Re Seagate Technology LLC: A Clean Slate for
Willfulness, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47, 62 (2008) (emphasis added); see also
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 ("This standard.., allows for punitive damages in a
manner inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.. .
33. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
[Vol. 52
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either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the
accused infringer." 34 Under this test, an infringer acts willfully only
if his acts are determined to be both objectively and subjectively
reckless, regardless of his state of mind at the time of infringement.35
The effect of this objective/subjective standard makes it
extraordinarily difficult for patentees to prove willfulness. 36
Accordingly, the Seagate standard is thought to be more favorable to
defendant infringers than the previous "affirmative duty of care"
standard.37 The Seagate standard is currently utilized to determine
"willfulness" in patent litigation.38
B. Brooks: The Attorney's Fees Standard Under Section 285
The discretionary allowance of attorney's fees in patent litigation
became available to litigants in 1946.39 Codified into 35 U.S.C 285
(Section 285)40 in 1952, this statute grants courts the discretion to
award attorney's fees to reimburse an injured party4' when a case is
held to be "exceptional. ' 42  Throughout most of the statute's
existence, courts had the discretion to determine whether a case was
"exceptional" using a "totality of the circumstances" standard.43 In
2005, the Federal Circuit changed the attorney's fee standard when it
held in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc.
that a case is "exceptional" under Section 285 only when a party
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1371; see also Prati, supra note 32, at 60.
36. See Hopenfeld, supra note 30, at 20.
37. See Prati, supra note 32, at 50.
38. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 660-61 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
39. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1753 (2014).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
41. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
42. Jennifer H. Wu & Jenny C. Wu, Giving Teeth to 35 U.S.C. S 285 to Award
Attorneys'Fees Against Vexatious Plaintiff Patentees, 62 Fed. Law. 44, 46 (2015).
43. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754 (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal
Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 688, 691 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
2016]
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engages in "material inappropriate conduct" 44 or - and most relevant
to the focus of this note - when "both (1) the litigation is brought in
subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless., 45
For litigation to be objectively baseless, it must be "so unreasonable
that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed ....
Litigation is brought in subjective bad faith only when the plaintiff
"actually know[s]" the litigation is objectively baseless. 47  This
objective/subjective standard to award attorney's fees came to be
known as the "Brooks standard., 48
C. Supreme Court Eliminates the Brooks Standard in Octane in 2014
During the 2014 term, the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness, LLC.
v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. rejected the Brooks standard used to
determine the appropriateness of awarding attorney's fees in patent
infringement cases under Section 285.4 9 Octane relaxed the standard
to determine "exceptional" cases and returned to courts the discretion
to determine when to award attorney's fees under a "totality of the
circumstances" standard.5 °
In Octane, the Court denounced the Brooks standard as being
unduly rigid and mechanical, impermissibly cumbersome, 51 and
inconsistent with the statutory text of Section 285.52 The Court
proclaimed that a case may be deemed "exceptional" if a litigant
either brings a case in subjective bad faith or the litigation is
objectively baseless. 53 Brooks' requirement that both the objective
and subjective prongs be satisfied prior to any award of attorney's
44. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
47. Id. at 1377.
48. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755.
49. See id. at 1758.
50. See High Court Takes Up Issue of Willful Patent Infringement, 22 NO. 14
Westlaw J. Intell. Prop. 7, 1 (2015).
51. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755.
52. Id. at 1753.
53. Id. at 1757.
[Vol. 52
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fees, the Court says, renders Section 285 "largely superfluous." 54 The
Court also found the Brooks standard impermissibly encumbered the
discretion granted to courts under the text of Section 285,"5 which
"superimpose[ed] an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is
inherently flexible." 56 Ultimately, the Court revived and reinstituted
the previous "totality of the circumstances" standard used to
determine an award of attorney's fees under Section 285. 57
D. Supreme Court Considers Eliminating the Seagate
Standard in 2016
Today, the debate centers on the Court's rationale in Octane, and
how, if at all, Octane's rationale should impact the Seagate standard
currently used to determine the enhancement of damages for willful
infringement.58 In October of 2015, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari59 in two cases, Stryker v. Zimmer 60 and Halo v. Pulse,6 1 to
determine whether the Seagate standard remains valid in light of its
holding in Octane in 2014.62 The petitioners argue the Seagate
standard is virtually identical to the Brooks standard rejected by the
54. Id. at 1758.
55. Id. at 1755.
56. Id. at 1756.
57. See id. at 1758.
58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769
F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (The question presented to the Supreme Court in Stryker
and Halo is "[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred by applying a rigid, two-part test
for enhancing patent infringement damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, that is the same
as the rigid, two-part test this Court rejected last term in Octane [] for imposing
attorney fees under the similarly-worded 35 U.S.C. § 285."); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(No. 14-1520).
59. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-1520); Halo Elecs., Inc. v.
Pulse Elecs., Inc, 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014, cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3018
(U.S. Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-1513).
60. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-1520).
61. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-1513).
62. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-
1520); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513).
2016]
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Supreme Court in Octane.63 Accordingly, the petitioners contend the
Seagate standard should be rejected for the reasons the Court laid out
in Octane.64 Like the Octane petitioners,65 the Stryker and Halo
petitioners argue the objective/subjective inquiry required by the
Seagate standard is too rigid,66 undermines the statute's "intended
deterrent effect,, 67 and "renders enhanced damages under Section 284
largely unattainable., 68  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
petitioners argue the Seagate standard effectively strips courts of the
discretion to determine the enhancement of damages granted to them
under Section 284.69
The petitioners in Stryker and Halo ask the Court to abandon the
Seagate standard, 70  and alter the standard used to determine
willfulness to the "totality of the circumstances" standard laid out in
Octane.71 The petitioners argue "totality of the circumstances" is the
only standard which "keep[s] with the statutory text [of] Section
284. "72 Before the Court uses Octane as a guidepost in its
examination of the current standard to award enhanced damages, the
Court should first determine if the Seagate and Brooks standards are
linked in any way.
63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-1520);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513).
64. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-
1520).
65. See Brief for the Petitioner, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184).
66. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-1520);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513).
67. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-1520);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513).
68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-1520).
69. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, 47, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-
1520); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 37, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513).
70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513)
("This Court should grant review to eliminate the Federal Circuit's unsupported
artifice" that willfulness be proven using the objective/subjective test.).
71. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 34, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-
1520).
72. Id.
200 [Vol. 52
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III. SECTIONS 284 AND 285 HISTORICALLY HAVE NOT BEEN LINKED
The petitioners in both Stryker and Halo attempt to link the
Brooks and Seagate standards. 73 The petitioners' reliance on such a
linkage between the two standards is the crux of their respective case
for repealing the Seagate framework.74 It is imperative to thoroughly
examine the jurisprudential histories of the Brooks and Seagate
standards to properly determine whether the two are, in fact, linked.
The notion that sections 284 and 285 and their respective
standards75 are somehow linked is not without precedent. The Federal
Circuit in iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc. stated "[t]he objective
baselessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys' fees...
under Brooks Furniture is identical to the objective recklessness
standard for enhanced damages and attorneys' fees ... under
[Seagate].' '76 Similarly, in her concurrence in Halo, Federal Circuit
Court Judge Kathleen M. O'Malley drew three analogies between the
two frameworks: (1) "[o]ur current two-prong, objective/subjective
test for willful infringement set out in [Seagate] is analogous to the
test this court prescribed for the award of attorneys' fees under
Section 285 in Brooks... ;,77 (2) "[t]he parallel between our tests for
these two issues is not surprising [as] [b]oth enhanced damages and
attorneys' fees are authorized under similar provisions in Title 35 of
the United States Code (the Patent Act of 1952); " 78 and (3) "our
standard for the award of enhanced damages under Section 284 has
73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-1520)
("Brooks Furniture imposed a two-part objective-subjective inquiry similar, if not
identical, to the Seagate test for willfulness."); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26,
Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513) ("[W]illfulness can be proven only under the
same rigid two-part objective/subjective test that this Court rejected in Octane for
the similarly flexible § 285." (quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
74. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Stryker, 782 F.3d 649 (No. 14-
1520); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513).
75. The Brooks standard to determine attorney fees; and the Seagate standard
to determine enhanced damages.
76. iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added).
77. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs. Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(O'Malley, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
78. Id.
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closely mirrored our standard for the award of attorneys' fees under
Section 285."' 7
Notably, Judge O'Malley makes the above assertions under the
assumption that:
[the Seagate standard] and [the Brooks standard were] both
predicated on [the Federal Circuit's] interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. ("PRE ),80 which [the Federal
Circuit] believed required a two-step objective/subjective inquiry
before either enhanced damages or attorneys' fees could be
awarded.81
Contrary to the learned judge's assumption in her concurring opinion,
the two standards were not both predicated on PRE. Though the
Brooks standard was indeed based on an objective/subjective test
introduced in PRE, the Seagate standard's origin is rooted in two very
different objective/subjective tests established in Yurman Design, Inc.
v. PAJ, Inc. 82 and Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr.83 Yurman
and Safeco grapple with vastly dissimilar legal issues in legal contexts
unrelated to than those found in PRE. Further, Seagate, which was
decided two years after Brooks, mentions neither PRE nor Brooks.
Likewise, Brooks mentions neither Yurman nor Safeco.
A. Jurisprudential Basis for the Brooks Standard.- PRE
The Brooks standard finds its origins in PRE, a case dealing
primarily with the issue of antitrust liability under the Noerr
doctrine. 84 In PRE, the Supreme Court defined when litigation is a
"sham" (i.e. when a party brings a baseless lawsuit). 85 The Federal
Circuit in Brooks imported PRE's rationale for determining "sham"
79. Id.
80. Prof 1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49
(1993).
81. Halo, 769 F.3d at 1384 (internal citation omitted).
82. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PA, Inc., 262 F.3d 101 (2001).
83. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
84. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct 1749, 1757
(2014).
85. Id.
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litigation into its determination of when a case is "exceptional,"
sufficient to warrant an award of attorney's fees under Section 285.86
A basic understanding of the rationale delineated in PRE is crucial to
understand the flaw in the Federal Circuit's importation of the PRE
standard into attorney's fee awards in the patent litigation realm.
When a party invokes the Noerr doctrine, they "seek immunity
from a judicial declaration that their filing of a lawsuit was actually
unlawful., 8 7 In PRE, the plaintiffs brought suit against a competitor
alleging copyright infringement.88 The defendants filed antitrust
counterclaims alleging the plaintiffs copyright action was a "sham,"
or a veiled attempt to monopolize and disrupt the business activities of
the defendant.89 If the defendants had convinced the court that the
lawsuit was a "sham," the plaintiff would have been stripped of his
antitrust immunity under the Noerr doctrine and exposed to treble
damages and attorney's fees under the antitrust liability statute.90  If
the defendant failed to prove the suit was a "sham," however, the
Noerr doctrine would have immunized the plaintiff from antitrust
liability,91 and shielded them from having to pay treble damages and
attorney's fees. 92
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1757-58.
88. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
52 (1993) (Though a copyright infringement case, the court's focus is on the
antitrust liability statute.).
89. Id.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) ("and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
91. See E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 144 (1961); see also Octane, 134 S. Ct at 1757 (2014) ("Under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine... defendants are immune from antitrust liability for engaging
in... litigation.., aimed at influencing decisionmaking by the government. But
under a 'sham exception' to [the Noerr] doctrine, activity.. . 'directed toward
influencing governmental action' does not qualify for Noerr immunity if it 'is a
mere sham to cover. . . an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor.").
92. E. R. R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at n.5 (citing Section 4 of the
Clayton Act) ("Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
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PRE's holding defines when a lawsuit is a "sham" sufficient to
revoke immunity privileges under the Noerr doctrine. 93 It outlines a
two-part framework. 94 "First the lawsuit must be objectively baseless
in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits." 95 Second, the court determines "whether the
baseless lawsuit conceals 'an attempt to interfere directly' with the
business relationships of a competitor. "96 The Federal Circuit in
Brooks found PRE's objective/subjective framework instructive in
fashioning the standard used to determine when a case is sufficiently
"exceptional" so as to award attorney's fees under Section 285. 9 7
However, the Supreme Court in Octane ultimately rejected the Federal
Circuit's importation of the PRE framework into its Brooks standard.
98
Octane determined the PRE standard "to have no roots in the text
of Section 285," and found that it "makes little sense in the context of
determining whether a case is so 'exceptional' as to justify an award
of attorney's fees in patent litigation."99  As stated in Octane, the
"Noerr-Pennington doctrine [was narrowly crafted]... to avoid
chilling the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the
government for the redress of grievances."'' 00 The Court was unable
to grasp how the shifting of fees in an "exceptional" patent case would
diminish any right to petition under the First Amendment.' 10 The
Court then goes on to state that "[t]he threat of antitrust liability (and
the attendant treble damages...) far more significantly chills the
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012)).
93. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60; see generally E. R. R.
Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144 (Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
[threats of litigation] [are] protected as free speech and freedom to petition, and are
generally immune from suit unless the threatened lawsuit was a 'sham.').
94. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 60-61 (quoting E. R. R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144).
97. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
98. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1757-58 (2014).
99. Id. at 1757.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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exercise of the right to petition than does the mere shifting of
attorney's fees."'10 2 The Court describes an award of attorney's fees in
patent litigation as "a far less onerous declaration" than a judicial
declaration which potentially exposes a party to treble damages.10
3
Interesting to note, an award of attorney's fees under Section 285
imposes no threat of treble damages, whereas enhanced damages
under Section 284 does. For that reason, the treble damages available
as a penalty for bringing "sham" litigation seems far more analogous
to the treble damages available for "willful" infringement than to
attorney's fees in "exceptional" cases. This fact notwithstanding, the
Seagate standard finds no roots in PRE.
B. Jurisprudential Basis for the Seagate Standard: Yurman & Safeco
In fashioning the current Seagate standard, the Federal Circuit in
Seagate primarily relied on two cases. The first is Yurman, a 2001
Second Circuit Court of Appeal copyright infringement case. 104 The
second is Safeco, a 2007 Supreme Court punitive damages case
centered on an alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 105
1. Seagate's Reliance on Yurman
Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act contains a provision that
grants to courts the discretion to enhance damages for "willful"
infringement. 10 6 In Yurman, the court defines the minimum level of
culpability required to entitle an infringed party to enhanced damages
under the Copyright Act. 10 7  Yurman held "[w]illfulness in [the
copyright infringement] context means that the defendant 'recklessly
disregarded' the possibility that 'its conduct represented
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 1757-58.
104. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101 (2001).
105. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
106. 17 U.S.C § 504(c) (2012) (Important to note that the Copyright Act uses
the term "willful" in the statute while § 284 does not.).
107. See Yurman, 262 F.3d at 112 (citing Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92,
97 (2d Cir. 1999) and Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1010 (2d Cir.
1995)).
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infringement," ' ' 10 8 and that "[r]eckless disregard of the copyright
holder's rights... suffices to warrant award of enhanced damages."' 0 9
It further held that a "plaintiff is not required to show the defendant
'had knowledge that its actions constitute[d] an infringement.""'"
The Federal Circuit used Yurman as a guide in constructing the
Seagate standard, indicating its belief that enhanced damages
available under the Copyright Act were, at least in some respects,
analogous to enhanced damages under the Patent Act.
The Seagate court also uses the language in Yurman to reaffirm
"willfulness" as an essential component of an award of enhanced
damages,"' and to demonstrate that the "recklessness standard" for
determining "willfulness" has been utilized in at least one context
similar, if not identical, to patent infringement litigation - copyright
infringement litigation.112 The Seagate court cited various other cases
employing the "recklessness standard" as a minimum standard for
determining "willfulness" in similar civil contexts. 113
As discussed further in Part V, in its importation of the standard in
Yurman, the Seagate court deviates from the Yurman standard in one
crucial way - it mandates both objective and subjective recklessness
rather than allowing mere objective recklessness to suffice as the
minimum degree of conduct for a finding of willful infringement.
2. Seagate 's Reliance on Safeco
In addition to Yurman, the Seagate court heavily relied upon
Safeco, a case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), for
the proposition that "willfulness" is a "statutory condition of civil
108. Id. (internal citations omitted).
109. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1010).
110. Id. (quoting Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1010).
111. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.1999);
Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 511-12 (7th
Cir.1994); RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 779
(8th Cir.1988); and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)
(the Court notes that its structure of the permanent injunction standard under the
Patent Act creates harmony with the Copyright Act)).
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liability for punitive damages." 114 The FCRA requires that insurers
give notice to a consumer before taking legal action against them
based upon information reflected in their credit report.115 The
consumer becomes entitled to actual damages when the insurer
negligently fails to give notice. 1 6 However, if the consumer proves
the insurer willfully failed to give notice, the insurer becomes liable
for actual, statutory, and punitive damages under the relevant
statute." 7 In Safeco, a class action was brought against an insurer for
willfully failing to give notice in violation of the FCRA. 118
Safeco reaffirms the notion that willfulness covers "not only
knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well."'' 19
Quoting the treatise on the Law of Torts, the Court held that "reckless
disregard" of the law is a "willful" violation under the common law
usage of the term. 120 The Court added that willful failure to comply
includes "conduct marked by careless disregard [for] whether []
someone has the right to act."' 12 1 "Careless disregard" in the civil
liability realm is determined by an objective standard and is that
conduct which constitutes "an unjustifiably high risk of harm."'122
Safeco allows a finding of willfulness to be predicated upon either a
finding of objective or subjective recklessness, whereas Seagate
requires a finding of both objective and subjective recklessness.
The statutory and jurisprudential histories of the separate
standards utilized to award attorney's fees under Section 285 and
enhance damages under Section 284 indicate no linkage between the
two standards. Therefore, an alteration to one standard should have
no bearing on any alteration to the other.
114. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370 (emphasis added) (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)).
115. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(m)(a) (2012)).
116. Id. at 53.
117. Id.
118. Id.at55.
119. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
120. Id. (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS
§ 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)).
121. Id. (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933)).
122. Id. at 49 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).
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IV. SECTIONS 284 AND 285 SHOULD NOT BE LINKED
A. The Two Statutes Serve Distinct Legal Purposes
There are two main types of damages awarded in patent
infringement cases: compensatory damages and punitive damages. 123
Each serves a purpose distinct from the other. 24 Compensatory
awards seek to reimburse a victim for the direct loss suffered at the
hands of another. 125  Punitive damages, on the other hand, aim to
punish a defendant for his or her actions and deter future
misconduct. 126  Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages
require certain constitutional safeguards to ensure that property is not
taken arbitrarily. 127 As detailed below, Section 285 serves a
compensatory purpose,128 while Section 284 operates as a punitive
remedy. 2 9  The constitutional implications stemming from the
punitive nature of an award under Section 284 require it to maintain a
higher standard than is allowable for an award of compensatory
attorney's fees under Section 285. The distinct legal purposes served
by each award bolster the notion that the two standards should not be
considered "linked."
1. Section 285 is Compensatory
An award for attorney's fees serves a compensatory purpose,' 30
and the discretion to award attorney's fees most often resides within
123. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-417
(2003) ("[the] Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution imposes substantive limits on th[e] discretion [to award punitive
damages.").
128. See Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 203 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
129. Prati, supra note 32, at 63.
130. See Eddy, 59 F.3d at 203; see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Natzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the inherent power of the court.13 1 Historically, in the United States
each party to a lawsuit fronts the bill for their own litigation costs.1 32
An exception to this rule exists when a litigant acts with malice or in
bad faith. 133  If the litigant acts in bad faith, a court may award
attorney's fees to the aggrieved party. 134 Courts are typically granted
wide latitude in awarding attorney's fees as a mechanism to maintain
control over litigation and litigants, as well as to compensate parties
forced to defend against bad faith litigants.1 35  Attorney's fees
awarded in patent infringement cases are no different. Section 285
exists to reimburse an injured party forced to undergo patent litigation
deemed to be "exceptional" in nature. 136 The rationale behind Section
285 is to award reasonable attorney's fees in circumstances where a
party to patent infringement litigation acts in bad faith, which results
in unnecessary litigation costs for the opposing party. 137
Previous patent litigants have unsuccessfully argued that an award
of attorney's fees under Section 285 is not compensatory, but punitive
in nature. 138 In 2004, litigants in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp., a
Federal Circuit case, argued that Section 285 is punitive in situations
where no actual damages are awarded. 139  The court summarily
rejected the litigant's contention, stating that such an argument finds
support in neither statute nor precedent. 140  The court went on to
affirm that an award of attorney's fees under Section 285 is wholly
compensatory. 141
131. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1347; Moore v. National Ass'n. of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
132. See HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, AWARDs OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 (2008).
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id.
135. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (citing
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
136. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 753-54 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
137. Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1380-81
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
138. Knorr-Bremse System Fuer Natzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Octane, in upholding the statutory discretion granted to courts
under Section 285, found the Federal Circuit overstepped its bounds
when it attempted to constrain the courts' discretion in awarding
compensatory attorney's fees under the Brooks standard. 142 Octane
determined the Brooks standard to be "unduly rigid," in part, because
it constrained the discretionary compensatory nature of the statutory
language of Section 285.143 As a result, Octane stripped Section 285
of the Brooks framework, and returned to courts the discretion to
award attorney's fees in exceptional cases under Section 285. The
Court was justified in doing so due to the compensatory nature of the
attorney's fee statute.
2. Section 284 is Punitive
The rationale in Octane for returning to courts the discretion to
award compensatory attorney's fees under Section 285 does not
extend to the discretion given to courts to award punitive enhanced
damages under Section 284. Enhanced damages under Section 284
seek to penalize and discourage behavior found to be more egregious
than that typically found in ordinary infringement cases. 144  By
definition, the awards are punitive, 145 and punitive damage awards
require certain constitutional safeguards to protect against the arbitrary
deprivation of property under the Due Process Clause' 46 of the United
States Constitution. 147 These constitutional safeguards 48 require that
Section 284 have a stricter standard than the virtually unfettered
discretion to award compensatory attorney's fees under Section 285.
142. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1749, 1751 (2014) (The Court found the Brooks Standard unduly rigid and
impermissibly cumbersome on the discretion granted to the lower courts under the
statute.).
143. Id. at 1755-56.
144. Rachel L. Emsley, Note, Copying Copyright's Willful Infringement
Standard: A Comparison of Enhanced Damages in Patent Law and Copyright Law,
42 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 157, 175 (2008).
145. Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("[E]nhanced damages are punitive, not compensatory."); Prati, supra note 32, at 63.
146. U.S. Const. amend. V.
147. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-417
(2003).
148. See id.
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Punitive damages are available to plaintiffs only as a remedy for a
defendant's willful or outrageous conduct. 149 The outrageousness of a
defendant's conduct is based upon his or her evil motive or reckless
indifference to the plaintiff s rights. 50 Without evidence of the
requisite outrageous standard of conduct, an award of punitive
damages cannot be upheld, as such an award would violate basic
constitutional principles. 151 In light of this constitutional requirement,
the Federal Circuit in Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing
and Lithographing Co. reattached to Section 284 a required finding of
"willfulness" prior to any award of enhanced damages.' 5 2  This
requirement sets Section 284 apart from the unfettered discretion
granted to courts by Section 285 in the wake of Octane. Absent the
Federal Circuit's "willfulness" requirement, the statutory language of
Section 284 would grant courts unconstrained discretion to award
punitive damages without proof of the defendant's willful or wanton
conduct. 153 This would not comport with the Due Process Clause or
legal precedent regarding punitive damage awards, 154 which require,
at a minimum, that the infringer act with reckless indifference to the
rights of the patentee. 1
55
Beatrice examined the punitive purpose and effect of Section 284
in some detail. The court began its examination by bifurcating the
two paragraphs of the statute. 156 The first paragraph of Section 284,
the court says, houses the actual damages to be awarded to
compensate the patentee for the direct harm caused by the defendant's
149. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409 (2009).
150. BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §
21:24 (2d ed. 2015).
151. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 408.
152. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co.,
923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (1991).
153. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
154. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008) ("The prevailing
rule in American courts [] limits punitive damages to cases of [] 'enormity,' where a
defendant's conduct is 'outrageous,' [] owing to 'gross negligence,' 'willful,
wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others,' or behavior even more
deplorable.").
155. Prati, supra note 32, at 63; see also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.,
262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97
(2d Cir. 1999); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1010 (2d Cir. 1995).
156. See Beatrice, 923 F.2d at 1578.
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infiingement. 157 The enhanced damages available under the second
paragraph of the statute are to be awarded "only as a penalty for an
infringer's increased culpability, namely willful infringement ....
The court held that "the enhanced portion of the damage award []
cannot be compensatory, and it, therefore, is punitive. ' 59 The
Supreme Court also considers the enhanced damages paragraph of
Section 284 to allow for a punitive, non-compensatory award. 160 In
Aro Manufacturing. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co, the Supreme
Court specifically describes Section 284 as an award of "punitive or
'increased' damages."'16 1 The punitive nature of Section 284, and the
constitutionally mandated requirement for a showing of willfulness
prior to an award of enhanced damages under Section 284 sets the
statute apart from the virtually unrestrained discretion granted to
courts by Section 285 under Octane.
B. The Statutes Treat Litigants Unequally
Another key distinction between Sections 284 and 285 is their
respective treatment of litigants. As previously stated, an award of
attorney's fees serves to compensate a party for the cost to defend
against bad faith litigation. 162 Awards under Section 285 are granted
to a party who proves the opposing party acted in bad faith, regardless
of whether the party is the patentee or the accused infringer. 63 For
that reason, Section 285 is considered a double-edged sword, 164 as
either party may be awarded attorney's fees under Section 285.
If an award of attorney's fees under Section 285 is a double-edged
sword, an enhanced damage award under Section 284 is a single-
bladed guillotine available for use only by patentees who prove the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1579 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 1580 (citing Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,
745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
160. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,
508 (1964).
161. Id.
162. See Cohen, supra note 133, at 4.
163. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380-
81 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
164. See id.
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infringer acted "willfully."' 165 Moreover, if a patentee successfully
proves the infringer acted willfully, under both the previous Brooks
standard and the current Octane standard, the defendant's willful
conduct may deem the case "exceptional," entitling the patentee to
attorney's fees under Section 285, in addition to enhanced damages
under Section 284.166 No provision akin to Section 284 is available to
an alleged infringer who successfully overcomes a patentee's
unfounded allegations of infringement. No matter how outrageous the
patentee's behavior, alleged infringers are entitled only to
compensation for their defense of an "exceptional" case brought in
bad faith. The nature of Section 284 being one-sided in favor of
patentees makes a higher standard for Section 284 critical to
safeguarding the interests of defendants in patent infringement
litigation.
As indicated in Part III of this note, the standards utilized to
determine awards under Sections 284 and 285 have not been linked
historically. To link the two now would be unwise as each serves a
distinct legal purpose, and the two standards necessarily treat litigants
in an unequal manner.
V. THE SEAGATE STANDARD SHOULD BE MODIFIED WITHOUT
GUIDANCE FROM OCTANE
The current standard used to determine enhanced damage awards
under Section 284 requires modification to close a loophole that
currently allows intentional infringers to escape liability so long as
they can show their infringement was not objectively reckless.' 67
Alteration is also necessary because the Seagate standard mandates
that the infringer's conduct be objectively reckless. This requirement
misconstrues the long-held civil law standard that objective
recklessness serves as the minimum degree of conduct sufficient to
prove willful conduct, not a necessary one. Both of these flaws
stemming from the current Seagate standard are easily rectified by
simply converting it from its current "and" test - which requires both
165. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
166. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1754 (2014) (citing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
167. See Prati, supra note 32, at 63.
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objective recklessness and subjective intent to be proven - to an "or"
test, which would allow either objective recklessness or subjective
intent to prove willful infringement. As articulated in Parts III and IV
of this note, Octane's rationale should not factor into the Court's
discussion of the current Seagate standard, or have any bearing on
Seagate's modification.
A. The Seagate Loophole
Seagate indicates the focus of an inquiry into willful infringement
should center on the infringer's prelitigation conduct.168 However, an
infringer can currently defeat a finding of willful infringement - even
when the infringer acts intentionally - if their defense counsel raises
a "not-unreasonable" defense concocted after the infringement suit is
brought against them. 169 The infringer is not currently required to
show proof of knowledge concerning the existing patent's invalidity
prior to the commencement of the litigation for their defense to be
successful. This is one of the central issues the Supreme Court has
agreed to review in Stryker and Halo. A basic recitation of the facts
of Stryker and Halo highlight the controversy surrounding the
loophole found in the current Seagate framework.
In Stryker, the patentee, Stryker, successfully proved its
competitor, Zimmer, replicated its patented medical device with the
subjective intent to do so.1 70 Zimmer unsuccessfully defended on the
grounds the medical device was obvious, therefore not entitled to a
patent, and thus is invalid - the so-called "invalidity defense."'1 71
The jury heard testimony that the infringer "all but instructed its
design team to copy the [patentee's] products," and determined the
infringer's actions to be willful. 172 The trial court agreed and awarded
the patentee treble damages under Section 284.173 The Federal Circuit
168. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
169. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs.,
Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1513),
http://www. supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/14-
1513_4e46.pdf.
170. Stryker v. Zimmer, 782 F.3d 649, 653 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
171. Id.
172. ld. at 661.
173. Id. at 653.
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reversed the award of enhanced damages finding that Zimmer's
defense, though unsuccessful, was nonetheless "not unreasonable."''
74
According to the court, Zimmer's "not unreasonable" invalidity
defense precludes a finding of objective recklessness.' 75
Similarly, in Halo, the patentee, Halo, successfully proved Pulse,
the infringer, copied its patented electronic device with the subjective
intent to do so.1 7 6 The jury found that Pulse knew of Halo's existing
patents four years prior to inducing its manufacturers to infringe upon
Halo's patent and made no attempts to obtain an opinion of counsel
seeking to clarify the validity of the existing patents. 177 Like the
infringer in Stryker, Pulse unsuccessfully asserted the invalidity
defense. 178 The jury determined Pulse's infringement to be willful.'79
The trial court, however, entered judgment of no willful infringement,
finding Pulse had "reasonably relied on [its not unreasonable
invalidity] defense," and thus could not have acted in an objectively
reckless manner.1 80 The Federal Circuit affirmed.
In both cases, the infringers knew of the existence of the patents
held by their competitors, and evidence proved their subjective intent
to replicate their competitors' patents.' 81 Neither infringer obtained an
opinion of counsel prior to litigation regarding the validity of the
patent they were found to have infringed.182 Yet both defendants'
assertion of the invalidity defense precluded a finding of objective
recklessness under the objective prong of the Seagate standard. Both
escaped enhanced damage liability as a result. Stryker and Halo
illustrate that a patent can be intentionally infringed yet determined
174. Id. at 662.
175. Id.
176. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Order, Halo, 769 F.3d 1371 (No. 14-1513), 2013 WL
2319145, at *15).
181. See id.; see also Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 653 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
182. Halo, 769 F.3d at 1376; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Stryker
Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc. 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1520).
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not to have been infringed "willfully." This defies logic and is
counter to common sense.
If prelitigation conduct is truly the focus of the inquiry into
willfulness,183 invalidity defenses should only be deemed reasonable
when the defendant can offer proof of their belief that a patent's
invalidity existed prior to the patentee taking legal action. As a matter
of public policy, post hoc litigation defenses should not factor into
whether the infringer acted in an objectively reckless manner prior to
the commencement of the lawsuit, especially where evidence proves
either the infringer acted intentionally or in a subjectively reckless
manner at the time of infringement. An opinion of counsel detailing
the reasoning for a patent's invalidity drafted prior to the
commencement of litigation would be strong evidence in this regard.
This would encourage both the proper investigation of an existing
patent's validity, and the taking of steps necessary to more
successfully defend against a claim of willful infringement. Liability
under the objective prong of the Section 284 analysis should only be
imposed when defendants fail to take steps to ensure non-infringement
prior to marketing their "invention."
Some may argue the cost to obtain an opinion of counsel
regarding a patent's validity would disenfranchise those non-corporate
conglomerates with shallower pockets. They may argue that big
corporations have an advantage - by way of monetary capacity - in
determining whether an existing patent is valid. This advantage, it
could be argued, would then extend to give the large corporations an
advantage in defending against an allegation of willful infringement
under the objective prong of the willfulness inquiry. This is true and
important considering the majority of filings for patents in recent
years are by wealthy, publically held corporations. 184 However, an
argument that one may have a greater opportunity to hire counsel to
more fully investigate an existing patent prior to infringement is no
different than an argument that wealthy defendants have an advantage
in litigation due to their ability to hire superior counsel. Section 284
exists to protect patentees, not those who willfully infringe a
183. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
184. See ANTHONY BREITZMAN, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PATENT TRENDS
AMONG SMALL AND LARGE INNOVATIVE FIRms DURING THE 2007-2009 RECESSION 3
(2013).
[Vol. 52
27
Hicks: Breaking the “Link” Between Awards for Attorney’s Fees and Enhanc
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
BREAKING THE "LINK" IN PATENT LAW
patentee's property rights. Patent holders should not be penalized due
to a perceived disparity of wealth among those who infringe their
patents.
The author, like Seagate, believes opinions of counsel should be
encouraged, 185 not required. Moreover, an opinion of counsel is not
the most important piece in the willfulness inquiry. As stated in
Seagate, the use of an opinion of counsel in defending against an
allegation of willful infringement is only one factor to be considered
in the inquiry and is not dispositive.186 It is crucial to remember that a
finding of willfulness merely permits an award of enhanced damages.
It does not mandate one. If the court so chooses, it has the discretion
under Section 284 to take the wealth of the defendant into account
when calculating how little or how much an award should be
enhanced.
B. Convert the Seagate Standard from an "And" to an "Or" Test
Aside from the loophole for "not-unreasonable" invalidity
defenses, the current Seagate standard should be modified to align it
with the minimum degree of culpability required to find willful
conduct in other civil contexts. This can be achieved simply by
converting the Seagate standard from an "and" test to an "or" test.
The most apparent defect in the current Seagate standard resides
within the language of Seagate itself Seagate overruled the prior
"affirmative duty of care" test by requiring "at least a showing of
objective recklessness" to prove willful infringement.187 As indicated
in Part III of this note, this standard would comport with the requisite
minimum degree of culpability to show willfulness in other civil
punitive contexts. However, Seagate went on to require a finding of
both objective and subjective recklessness. 188 A requirement that both
levels of culpability exist in order to find willfulness fails to conform
185. See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369 (citing Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper
Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed.Cir.1994) ("Possession of a favorable
opinion of counsel is not essential to avoid a willfulness determination; it is only one
factor to be considered, albeit an important one.").
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1371 (emphasis added).
188. See id. (The court can only begin an inquiry into the subjective prong
after finding the objective prong is satisfied.).
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to the standard to prove willfulness in all other civil contexts. It also
fails to conform to the principles laid out in Safeco, the primary case
relied upon by the Seagate court when it fashioned the Seagate
standard.
Under Safeco's rationale, objective recklessness on the part of a
patent infringer alone - even absent a showing of subjective
recklessness - should be sufficient to prove willfulness. Similar to
its treatment of the rationale in Yurman, however, Seagate imports the
Safeco objective recklessness standard into the Seagate framework
with a drastic and meaningful modification: objective recklessness is
not a minimum standard of conduct to determine willfulness - it is a
mandatory one.189 Perplexingly, the court did so after opining that
"proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires
at least a showing of objective recklessness."'' 90
Seagate gives no indication why willfulness in the patent
infringement context requires both objective and subjective
recklessness, while willfulness in the copyright infringement context
under Safeco and the antitrust liability context in Yurman require only
objective recklessness. Is it necessary that a patent infringer act both
objectively and subjectively reckless to prove willfulness under
Section 284? A proper reading of Safeco and Yurman, and prior
determinations of willfulness in other civil contexts indicate not.
Reckless disregard of the law is a lower level of culpability than
knowing violations, and "knowing violations are sensibly understood
as a more serious subcategory of willful ones."'1 91 Common sense
dictates that if the more serious subcategory of culpability is proven,
inquiry into the less serious subcategory becomes irrelevant.
The Seagate standard needs to be modified. The Supreme Court
has the opportunity in Stryker and Halo to strip Seagate of its
requirement that both levels of culpability exist to find willfulness
sufficient to permit the enhancement of damages, and to close a
loophole which allows certain defendants to escape liability. The
Court should undertake this task without any guidance from the
Brooks or Octane standards used to determine attorney's fees under
189. Id. at 1371.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 59 (2007).
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Section 285, as no linkage exists between the awards for attorney's
fees and enhanced damages.
CONCLUSION
The current standard to prove willfulness sufficient to award
enhanced damages in patent infringement litigation requires
modification. It is clear, however, the current standard cannot be
returned to the pre-Seagate standard, as punitive damages require a
showing of more than mere negligence. 192  In fashioning the new
enhanced damages standard, the Court should opt against using
Octane's rationale as guidance because the two standards are
predicated on different case law, and their respective statutes serve
distinct legal purposes. The punitive nature of an enhanced damage
award under Section 284 requires it to have in place a stricter standard
than an award for compensatory attorney's fees under Section 285.
The Seagate standard's requirement that both objective and subjective
recklessness be proven in order to allow an award of enhanced
damages is too strict, and not aligned with the requisite level of
conduct in similar civil punitive contexts. Modifying the Seagate
standard to permit proof of either objective or subjective recklessness
to justify a finding of willful infringement cures this major deficiency
inherent in Seagate, while remaining within the confines of the Due
Process Clause.
Tyler A. Hicks*
192. See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
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